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Abstract  This  paper  analyzes  the  meaning  of  the  ‘common  good’  and  its  impact  on  economics.
It adopts  the  ‘classical  notion  of  the  common  good’  which,  conceived  by  Aristotle  and  further
developed  by  Thomas  Aquinas,  has  been  widely  used  for  centuries.  Sections  2  and  3  introduce
Aristotle’s  view  on  this  notion,  followed  by  Aquinas’  developments.  Section  4  addresses  the
different  meanings  of  common  good  in  the  20th  century.  Given  that  the  classical  version  of  the
common good  implies  an  anthropological  position  and  a  theory  of  the  good,  Section  5  extracts
them from  Aristotle’s  works,  while  Section  6  deduces  policy  implications  from  the  previous
deﬁnitions.  Finally,  Section  7  analyzes  two  current  economic  theories  from  the  point  of  view
of their  relation  with  the  common  good:  economics  of  happiness  and  the  capability  approach.
The ﬁnal  section  presents  a  brief  conclusion.
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Resumen  Este  documento  analiza  el  signiﬁcado  del  ‘‘bien  común’’  y  su  impacto  en  la
Economía. Adopta  la  ‘‘noción  clásica  del  bien  común’’  que,  concebida  por  Aristóteles  y  desar-
rollada posteriormente  por  Tomás  de  Aquino,  ha  sido  ampliamente  utilizada  durante  siglos.  La
segunda y  tercera  secciones  introducen  la  visión  aristotélica  sobre  esta  noción,  seguida  de  los
desarrollos de  Aquino.  La  cuarta  sección  aborda  los  diferentes  signiﬁcados  del  bien  común,
pertenecientes  al  siglo  XX.  Dado  que  la  versión  clásica  del  bien  común  implica  una  posición
antropológica  y  una  teoría  del  bien,  la  quinta  sección  extrae  ambos  conceptos  de  la  obra  de
Aristóteles, mientras  que  la  sección  sexta  deduce  las  implicaciones  políticas  de  las  deﬁniciones
anteriores.  Por  último,  la  séptima  sección  analiza  dos  teorías  económicas  actuales,  desde  el
punto de  vista  de  su  relación  con  el  bien  común:  la  economía  de  la  felicidad  y  el  enfoque  de
 ﬁnal  incluye  una  breve  conclusión.
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. Introduction
s  Andrew  Yuengert  states  in  his  essay  ‘‘The  Common  Good
or  Economists’’  (2000),  ‘‘economics  has  always  been  ori-
nted  towards  discussions  of  the  public  welfare;  arguments
or  free  markets  and  free  trade,  and  analytical  concepts
ike  public  goods,  Pareto  optimality,  externalities,  and  game
heory  have  all  been  developed  with  the  public  welfare  and
ublic  policy  in  mind.’’
Indeed,  Smith,  for  example,  claims  that  ‘‘[t]he  wise  and
irtuous  man  is  at  all  times  willing  that  his  own  private
nterest  should  be  sacriﬁced  to  the  public  interest  of  his
wn  particular  order  or  society’’  (1976,  p.  235  --  VI,  iii).  For
ill,  a  fair  government  must  look  for  citizens’  common  good
see  Brink,  2014).  Luigino  Bruni  has  written  extensively  on
8th-century  Neapolitan  philosopher  and  economist  Anto-
io  Genovesi,  who  revisits  the  classical  tradition  of  the  polis
ased  on  philia  to  posit  that  the  market  is  built  on  philia.
or  Genovesi,  reciprocity,  mutual  assistance,  and  fraternity
re  typical  elements  of  human  sociability,  while  the  market
s  part  of  civil  society  and,  as  such,  requires  individuals’  love
or  the  common  good  and  public  faith  to  operate  properly
see  Bruni,  2012,  Chapters  8  and  9).
However,  ‘‘public  interest’’  and  ‘‘common  good’’  do  not
ean  the  same  to  Smith,  Mill  or  Genovesi,  or  to  contempo-
ary  public  welfare  and  welfare  state  supporters.  Moreover,
t  seems  that  what  prevails  today  is  an  atomistic  view  of
tility-oriented  individuals,  with  very  limited  room  for  the
ommon  good.  As  a  result,  the  privatized  individual  good
s  dissociated  from  the  public  goods  supported  by  a  wel-
are  state.  Thus,  this  paper  will  argue  for  a  speciﬁc  view  of
he  common  good,  wherein  the  personal  and  common  good
erge,  and  it  will  look  at  the  economic  consequences  of  this
iew.
Actually,  the  ‘common  good’  has  become  a  buzz  word,
sed  in  so  many  different  contexts  that,  far  from  univo-
al,  yet  its  meaning  proves  bafﬂing  at  best.  Hence,  this
aper  adopts  the  ‘classical  notion  of  the  common  good’.
onceived  by  Aristotle  and  further  developed  later  by  St.
homas  Aquinas,  this  notion  has  been  widely  used  for  cen-
uries.
To  explore  the  speciﬁc  meaning  of  the  common  good  in
he  Aristotelian-Thomistic  tradition,  Section  2  introduces
ristotle’s  view  on  this  notion,  followed  by  Aquinas’  devel-
pments  in  the  following  section.  Section  4  addresses  the
ifferent  meanings  of  common  good  in  the  20th  century.
iven  that  the  classical  concept  of  the  common  good  implies
n  anthropological  position  and  a  Theory  of  the  Good,  Sec-
ion  5  extracts  them  from  Aristotle’s  works,  while  Section
 deduces  policy  implications  from  the  previous  deﬁnitions.
inally,  Section  7  analyzes  two  current  economic  theories
rom  the  point  of  view  of  their  relation  with  the  common
ood:  economics  of  happiness  and  the  capability  approach.
hy  these  two  theories?  Because,  given  that  they  particu-
arly  deal  with  individuals’  ends  --  happiness  and  capabilities
-  they  might  have  close  ties  with  the  common  good  or  may
eneﬁt  for  considering  it.  I  think  that  these  currents  could
ositively  contribute  to  building  an  economy  centered  in
uman  beings  if  their  deﬁnitions  of  happiness  and  capabil-
ties  are  consistent  with  the  search  for  the  common  good.
he  ﬁnal  section  presents  a  brief  conclusion.
a
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. The Aristotelian roots of  the concept of
ommon good
n  Politics  I,  1--2,  Aristotle  presents  two  strongly  metaphys-
cal  theses:  ﬁrst,  the  natural  character  of  the  polis  and,
econd,  the  political  nature  of  the  human  being  --  hoti  tôn
hysei  he  polis  esti  kai  hoti  anthrôpos  physei  politikon  zôon
Politics  I,  2  1253a  2--3).  From  a  metaphysical  point  of  view,
t  is  obvious  that,  given  its  substantial  nature,  the  human
eing  takes  precedence  over  the  city,  which  is  an  association
f  human  beings.  Then,  how  should  the  following  statement
y  Aristotle  be  interpreted?  Kai  proteron  dê  tê  physei  polis
ê  oikia  kai  ekastos  hêmôn  estin  --  ‘and  the  polis  is  prior
y  nature  to  the  house  and  to  each  one  of  us’  (1253a  19).
ristotle  recognizes  the  temporal  priority  of  the  parts  of  the
olis  when  he  explains  how  a  house  stems  from  the  union  of
 man  and  a  woman,  a clan  stems  from  the  union  of  many
ouses,  and  a  polis  stems  from  a  group  of  clans.  However,
e  adds:  telos  gar  haute  ekeinôn,  he  de  physis  telos  estin  --
for  it  [the  polis]  is  the  end  of  the  [former]  and  the  nature
s  the  end’  (1252b  31-2).  Thus,  individuals,  houses  and  clans
ave  the  polis  as  their  ﬁnal  end  and,  in  Aristotle’s  system,
he  ﬁnal  end  (‘the  reason  for  the  sake  of  which’)  is  the  ﬁrst
ause  of  every  reality.
For  Aristotle,  the  end,  though  it  may  be  last  chronologi-
ally,  is  ﬁrst  ontologically.  If  we  add  the  thesis  that  the  end
f  the  human  being  is  eudaimonia  or  euzên  (happiness  as
ersonal  fulﬁllment  or  ﬂourishing  as  a  result  of  a  good  life)
o  the  thesis  that  the  human  being  is  political,  then  human
eings  can  only  achieve  their  end  within  the  end  of  the  polis.
he  polis  exists  ‘for  the  sake  of  a  good  life’  (euzên,  1252b
0);  polis  is  and  ‘includes’  (Nicomachean  Ethics  --  NE  --  I,  2,
094b  7)  the  end  of  human  beings.  The  happiness  of  the  polis
eudaimonia)  is  the  same  as  the  happiness  of  the  individual
Politics  VII,  2,  1324a  5--8),  which  explains  why  ‘for  even  if
he  good  is  the  same  for  a  city  as  for  an  individual,  still  the
ood  of  the  city  is  apparently  a  greater  and  more  complete
ood  to  acquire  and  preserve’  (NE  I,  2,  1094b  8--9;  see  also
E  VIII,  9,  1160a  9--30).
This  good  of  both  polis  and  individuals  is  to  achieve  a
ood  life  that  leads  to  happiness:  ‘the  best  way  of  life,  for
ndividuals  severally  as  well  as  for  states  collectively,  is  the
ife  of  goodness’  (Politics  VII,  1,  1323b  40--41).  When  this
ood  is  complete  (teleion),  it  is  self-sufﬁcient  (autarkes).
owever,  Aristotle  notes,  ‘what  we  count  as  self-sufﬁcient
s  not  what  sufﬁces  for  a  solitary  person  by  himself,  living
n  isolated  life,  but  what  sufﬁces  also  for  parents,  children,
ife,  and,  in  general,  for  friends  and  fellow  citizens,  since
 human  being  is  a  naturally  political  animal’  (NE  I,  7,  1097b
--12).
Aristotle  repeats  these  ideas  in  Politics  and  in  his  books
n  ethics  --  for  example:  ‘The  end  [télos] and  purpose  of  a
olis  is  the  good  life,  and  the  institutions  of  social  life  are
eans  to  that  end.  A  polis  is  constituted  by  the  association  of
amilies  and  villages  in  a  perfect  and  self-sufﬁcing  existence;
nd  such  an  existence,  on  our  deﬁnition,  consists  in  a  life  of
rue  felicity  and  goodness  [tò  zên  eudaimónos  kaì  kalôs]. It
s  therefore  for  the  sake  of  good  actions  [kalôn  práxeon],
nd  not  for  the  sake  of  social  life  that  political  associations
politikèn  koinonían]  must  be  considered  to  exist’  (Politics
II,  9,  1280b  29--35  and  1280b  39  --  1281a  4).  Thus,  ‘the  polis
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which  is  morally  the  best  is  the  polis  which  is  happy  and  does
well  [práttousan  kalôs]’ (Politics  VII,  1,  1323b  30-1).
Consequently,  the  task  of  the  political  community  and
its  related  science  --  Politics  --  of  the  political  organization
and  of  society’s  authorities  is  to  drive  and  support  the  good
actions  that  enable  all  citizens  to  live  this  life  of  true  hap-
piness  and  goodness  --  i.e.,  a  life  of  virtues:  ‘the  political
philosopher  is  the  architect  of  the  end  that  we  refer  to  in
calling  something  bad  or  good’  (NE  VII,  11,  1052b  3--4).  Three
additional  quotes  on  this  topic  are  worth  mentioning:
1  ‘Political  science  spends  most  of  its  pains  on  making  the
citizens  to  be  of  a  certain  character,  viz.  good  and  capable
of  noble  acts’  (NE  I,  9,  1099b  30--31).  To  have  a  good
character  that  enables  noble  acts  is  to  be  virtuous.
2  ‘There  is  one  thing  clear  about  the  best  constitution:
it  must  be  a  political  organization  which  will  enable  all
sorts  of  men  [e.g.,  the  ‘contemplative’  as  well  as  the
‘practical’]1 to  be  at  their  best  and  live  happily  [árista
práttoi  kaì  zóe  makaríos]’  (Politics  VII,  2,  1324a  23--25;
quoted  also  by  Nussbaum,  1987,  p.  2).
3  ‘The  true  end  which  good  law-givers  should  keep  in  view,
for  any  state  or  stock  or  society  with  which  they  may  be
concerned,  is  the  enjoyment  of  partnership  in  a  good  life
and  the  felicity  [zoês  agathês  .  .  .  kaì  .  .  .  eudaimonías]
thereby  attainable’  (Politics  VII,  2,  1325a  7--10;  quoted
also  by  Nussbaum,  1987,  p.  3).
The  idea  of  the  common  good  underlies  these  notions.
Indeed,  in  Politics  III,  6  and  7,  Aristotle  refers  to  the  ‘com-
mon  interest’  (koine  sympheron), noting,  for  example,  that
‘governments  which  have  a  regard  for  the  common  inter-
est  are  constituted  in  accordance  with  strict  principles  of
justice  [general  or  legal]’  (1279a  17--18).  As  a  result,  Keys
(2006,  p.  3)  calls  him  ‘the  founder’  of  ‘common  good-
centered  political  theory’.  In  a  nutshell,  Aristotle  views  the
common  good  (or  end)  as  eudaimonia  for  all  citizens,  who
are  political  animals  and,  thus,  only  achievable  within  the
polis;  for  him,  the  common  good  is  the  end  of  a  just  polis.
3. Aquinas’ developments
According  to  Elders  (1996,  p.  47),  the  term  ‘bonum
commune’  appears  370  times  in  Aquinas’  works,  and  it  is
used  to  refer  to  God,  Christ,  the  perfection  and  order  of
created  things  and,  ﬁnally,  the  end  of  human  communities
(or  the  political  common  good).  Aquinas  follows  Aristotle  in
this  topic  (and  many  others),  ﬁrmly  believing  that  the  good
of  individuals  cannot  be  opposed  to  the  common  good.  The
latter  ‘comprises  and  unites  the  personal  goods  of  the  indi-
vidual  members  of  the  community’  (Elders,  1996,  p.  49).
Elders  explains  (1996,  pp.  50--51),
‘In  a  just  society  there  is  no  opposition  between  the  good
of  the  whole  and  that  of  the  individual  members:  by  pro-
moting  one’s  own  well-being  within  the  framework  of  the
society,  one  promotes  the  common  good.  On  the  other
hand,  by  working  for  the  common  good,  one  serves  best
1 Square brackets have been added in the original by Barker. If not
speciﬁed, other square brackets are mine.
i
t
(25
one’s  own  authentic  interests.  One  cannot  act  against  the
common  good  without  at  the  same  time  causing  damage
to  one’s  own  well-being.  According  to  St.  Thomas,  the
citizens  are  de  facto  promoting  the  common  good  when
they  devote  themselves  to  their  own  affairs  while  obey-
ing  the  laws,  provided  the  government  is  capable  and  the
laws  are  just.’
Indeed,  also  following  Aristotle,  Aquinas  thinks  that  the
bject  of  general  or  legal  justice  --  itself  a virtue  --  is  the
isposition  of  all  human  actions  toward  the  common  good
Summa  Theologiae--  ST  --  II-IIae  q.58,  a.5c).  The  common
ood  is  not  plural  (common  or  public  goods):  what  deﬁnes
he  common  good  is  not  a  quantitative  matter  but  indi-
iduals’  true  good.  Which  laws  is  Aquinas  speaking  about?
e  refers  to  just  laws,  which  can  be  positive  laws,  albeit
ectiﬁed  by  a  natural  law  that  points  to  the  true  good  of
ndividuals.  The  common  good  is  not  such  because  it  is  com-
on,  but  because  it  is  good.  The  introduction  of  natural  law
o  Aquinas’  common  good  theory  provides  a  differentiating
lement  that  reinforces  the  human  being’s  relational  condi-
ion  and  the  role  of  the  common  good  in  ethics  and  politics
see  Keys,  2006,  Chapter  5).  According  to  Aquinas,  natural
aw  is  linked  to  a  ‘natural  inclination’  toward  virtue,  a  notion
lso  incorporated  by  him.  In  his  Commentary  on  Aristotle’s
olitics(In  Pol),  he  notes:
‘the  human  being  is  the  best  of  the  animals  if  virtue,  to
which  he  has  a  natural  inclination,  is  perfected  in  him.
But  if  he  is  without  law  and  justice,  the  human  being  is
the  worst  of  all  the  animals  [.  . .] But  human  beings  are
brought  back  to  justice  by  means  of  political  order  [.  .  .]
Hence  it  is  evident  that  the  one  who  founded  the  city  kept
human  beings  from  being  most  evil  and  brought  them  to
a  state  of  excellence  in  accordance  with  justice  and  the
virtues’  (I,  1,  n.  41).
In  other  words,  humans  need  a  political  order  to  be  just
nd  virtuous,  thus  following  their  natural  inclination  toward
irtue  and,  as  a  result,  toward  happiness.  In  Aristotelian
erms,  law  (and  education)  helps  individuals  to  be  virtuous,
s  they  need  to  overcome  their  akrasia  (incontinence).  For
ristotle  and  Aquinas,  ‘natural’  does  not  mean  spontaneous
n  the  human  realm.  The  natural  human  order  is  not  a  deed
ut  a task  performed  by  following  human  beings’  natural
nclinations  (toward  community  and  virtue).  Yet,  this  must
e  reinforced  by  a  normative  and  ethical  order.
Drawing  away  from  Aristotle,  Aquinas  believes  that  the
olitical  common  good  is  not  the  highest  common  good,
hich  is  God  --  the  ﬁnal  common  good.  This  does  not  imply
hat  some  particular  human  actions  do  not  affect  the  politi-
al  common  good.  For  Aquinas,  even  the  most  private  human
ctions  have  a  communal  aspect  and  can  be  geared  (or
ot)  toward  the  political  common  good.  As  Martínez  Barrera
1992,  p.  159)  asserts,  ‘given  that  every  action  is  unavoid-
bly  ‘ad  alterum’,  it  is  politically  relevant,  because  politics
s  the  natural  fulﬁllment  of  people’s  actions’.  What  is  then
he  political  common  good  for  Aquinas?  As  Martínez  Barrera
1994,  p.  263)  also  explains,‘the  issue  of  common  good  is  that,  of  the  good  that  all
men  look  for  in  cooperating  in  the  perfect  community,  the
political  common  good  also  reveals  itself  as  the  constitu-
tion,  preservation  and  improvement  of  a  dynamic  order
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of  inter-subjective  relations  regulated  by  justice,  for  the
sake  of  a  superior  good  from  which  justice  itself  draws
its  goodness’.
This  is  for  Aquinas  the  main  role  of  politics.
Clearly,  at  this  point,  it  has  surely  become  apparent  that
oth  Aristotle  and  (especially)  Aquinas  view  the  common
ood  as  rooted  in  the  legitimacy  of  a  theory  of  the  good.
hough  ontologically  grounded,  the  common  good  is  for
hem  a  moral  category.  The  content  of  this  theory  of  the
ood  will  be  discussed  at  length  in  the  ﬁfth  section.  This
oint  is  clearer  in  Aquinas  than  in  Aristotle  --  so  much  so
hat  Mary  Keys  thinks  that  Aquinas  interrupts  his  Commen-
ary  on  Aristotle’s  Politics  in  book  III  because  the  rest  of  the
ook  undermines  the  universality  of  his  theory  of  the  good  in
rder  to  adapt  it  to  different  political  regimes.  She  asserts
2006,  pp.  65--66):
‘the  discourse  of  the  Politics  descends  quickly  from  the
light  of  abstract,  universal  ends  into  the  cave  of  regime
particularities  [.  .  .] Aquinas  at  this  point  parts  company
with  his  Stagirite  mentor  and  reverses  course,  bringing
the  argument  back  around  to  Aristotle’s  political  founda-
tions  in  nature,  justice  or  right,  and  virtue  in  an  effort  to
deepen  and  reinforce  them’.
Section  5  will  also  use  Aristotelian  grounds  to  argue  for  a
heory  of  the  good.
. The common good in the 20th century
he  classical  theory  of  the  common  good  was  revisited  in  the
0th  century,  mainly  by  Catholic  thinkers,  and  was  adopted
y  the  Catholic  Church’s  Social  Teaching.  This  doctrine
enaissance  included  a  debate  about  the  relation  between
articular  goods  and  the  common  good  to  determine  which
ne  takes  precedence  over  the  other,  especially  according
o  Aquinas.2
For  Aristotle,  there  is  no  opposition  between  these  goods:
rue  personal  good  is  a  common  good.  As  already  noted,
or  him,  ontologically  speaking,  the  individual  person  takes
riority;  however,  concerning  the  individual’s  end,  given
hat  he/she  is  a  political  being  by  nature,  his/her  end  is  a
ommon  end,  speciﬁed  in  each  person  in  a  particular  way
hrough  practical  reason.  The  political  common  good  is,
hen,  a  justice-centered  coordination  of  individual  actions
nd  society’s  institutions  --  good  for  both  society  and  every
itizen.  Indeed,  far  from  being  opposite,  common  and  par-
icular  (true)  goods  are  complementary  or  correlative.  The
act  that  the  speciﬁc  content  of  the  common  good  is  deter-
ined  by  practical  reason  does  not  mean  a  sort  of  relativism,
2 An original controversy took place between de Koninck (1943,
945) -- who sustains the primacy of the common good -- and
schmann (1943, 1945) and Maritain (1947). Lachance (1939) had
eld de Koninck’s position before and Simon (1944) entered later
nto the discussion. I do not want to delve into the details of this
ebate nor into the related differences on this respect between
ther later scholars’ positions like Russell Hittinger, Robert P.
eorge, Alasdair MacIntyre, Lawrence Dewan, and John Finnis and
ermainGrisez. For reviews and appraisals of the original contro-
ersy, see for example Smith (1995), Keys (1995), Walshe (2006),
nd Luquet (2010).
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ecause  practical  reason  is  able  to  discover  also  some  uni-
ersal  requirements  of  the  common  good.
For  Aquinas,  this  coincidence  between  common  and  par-
icular  good  might  be  not  without  tensions  and,  in  this  sense,
he  common  good  has  priority  over  the  particular  good.  He
sserts  (ST  I-II  q.  19,  a.  10):
‘Something  may  happen  to  be  good  under  a  particular
aspect,  which  is  not  good  under  a universal  aspect,  or
vice  versa,  as  stated  above  [in  the  execution  of  a  robber
the  judge  looks  for  the  common  good,  while  the  wife  of
the  robber  is  against  the  execution  as  a  particular  good].
Hence  it  happens  that  a  certain  will  is  good  in  willing
something  considered  under  a particular  aspect,  which
nevertheless  God  does  not  will  under  a  universal  aspect,
and  vice-versa’.3
In  several  passages,  Aquinas  afﬁrms  that  the  aim  of  the
olitical  society  or  the  laws  is  to  foster  the  common  good
see  ST  I-II,  q.  19,  a.  10;  q.  92,  a.1,  In  Pol  I,  1,  n.  11;  In  Ethic
,  2,  n.  30).  Sometimes  the  common  good  goes  against  our
articular  good;  in  these  cases,  we  should  understand  the
onvenience  of  pursuing  the  common  good  surpassing  our
nterests  or  affections.4
Aristotle  criticized  two  alternative  theories  of  society
nd  the  common  good.  In  Politics  III,  3,  he  asserts  that  a  city
s  more  than  its  place,  using  Babylon  to  illustrate  his  point,
s  this  city  ‘had  been  taken  for  three  days  before  some  part
f  the  inhabitants  became  aware  of  the  fact’  (1276a  29--30).
his  case  evokes  the  ethos  of  modern  liberal  theories.  For
ristotle,  the  polis  is  not  only  a  mere  plurality  of  individuals
see,  e.g.,  II,  2,  1261a  23).
He  also  considers  the  antecedents  of  current  totalitari-
nisms,  where  the  individual  good  does  not  exist  and  only
he  ‘common  good’  does.  In  fact,  in  this  version,  the  com-
on  good  becomes  a  generalized  private  good.  As  Aristotle
otes,
‘the  nature  of  a  polis  is  to  be  a  plurality,  and  in  tending  to
greater  unity,  from  being  a polis,  it  becomes  a family,  and
from  being  a  family,  an  individual  [.  . .] So  that  we  ought
not  to  attain  this  greatest  unity  even  if  we  could,  for  it
would  be  the  destruction  of  the  polis’  (1261a  18--23).
Let  us  take  a  quick  glance  at  these  two  alternative  views
f  the  common  good.
John  Rawls  has  developed  a  theory  of  a  ‘thick  common
ood’  but,  while  it  tackles  the  common  good,  this  theory  has
erious  problems.  For  Rawls,  his  theory  of  a  well-ordered
ociety,  based  on  his  famous  two  principles  of  justice,  will
ake  it  possible  for  all  to  look  for  their  individual  concep-
ions  of  the  good.  Yet,  his  view  of  rationality,  reducing  it
o  instrumental  rationality  and  neglecting  the  content  of
eople’s  desires  or  preferences  based  on  reason,  prevents  a
hared  view  of  the  good  by  deﬁnition  (see  1971,  Chapter  VII).
awls’  theory  is  procedural:  the  ‘right’  is  universal,  while
he  ‘good’  is  individual.  The  role  of  the  state  is  instrumen-
al:  it  has  to  guarantee  this  combination  of  right  and  good  by
3 See the comments of Simon (1961, pp. 41--42) and Keys (2006,
. 120) on this passage.
4 See also Simon (1965, pp. 86--107) on the internal character of
he common good.
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(The  common  good  and  economics  
means  of  procedural  regulations.  This  common  good  notion
hinges  solely  on  citizens’  assumed  ability  to  look  for  their
own  individual  goods.  Rawls  attempts  to  match  a  thick  the-
ory  of  the  ‘common  good’  with  a  thin  theory  of  the  ‘good’,
illustrating  a  liberal  theory  of  privatization  of  the  good.
Changing  the  meaning  of  the  words,  this  may  be  dubbed
a  theory  of  the  common  good,  but  it  strays  far  away  from
the  classical  theory.  For  this  liberal  view,  the  human  being  is
not  a  political  animal  in  the  classical  sense,  because  to  be  a
political  animal  means  sharing  a  theory  of  the  good.  Instead,
from  the  classical  standpoint,  the  individual  good  is  not
different  from  the  common  good.  As  MacIntyre  (1990,  pp.
344--345)  notes,  all  substantively  Aristotelian  or  Thomistic
views  rely  on  a  rational  agreement  on  the  content  of  the
human  good.
The  liberal  position  is  besieged  by  severe  issues.  First,  as
MacIntyre  also  states,  many  incompatible  theoretical  pos-
itions  coexist  within  the  liberal  view  --  ‘a  range  of  types  of
Kantianism,  a  similar  range  of  types  of  utilitarianism,  and  of
intuitionism,  contractarianism  and  various  blends  of  these
[as  in  Rawls]’  (1990,  p.  348)  --  with  no  speciﬁc  meta-criteria
to  choose  among  them.  Second,  a  theory  of  rights  or  rules
without  a  theory  of  the  good  does  not  help  to  ﬁnd  con-
sensual  solutions  for  deep  moral  questions.  For  example,
MacIntyre  raises  the  issues  of  abortion  and  old  age,  noting
that  a  procedural  approach  to  these  matters  automatically
implies  adopting  a  theory  of  the  good  without  discussing
it.  Here  is  MacIntyre  once  again:  ‘without  some  determi-
nate  conception  of  the  good  and  the  best,  it  would  be
impossible  to  provide  adequate  answers  to  these  questions’
(1990,  p.  353)  and,  ‘a  necessary  prerequisite  for  a  political
community’s  possession  of  adequately  determinate,  shared,
rationally  founded  moral  rules  is  the  shared  possession  of  a
rationally  justiﬁable  conception  of  human  good’  (1990,  p.
351).  This  is  why,  for  Leszek  Kolakowski  (1993),  a  perfectly
neutral  liberal  society  is  actually  unviable.
With  regard  to  the  second  alternative  in  Aristotle’s  clas-
sical  doctrine  of  the  common  good,  it  has  become  widely
rejected  today,  because  it  implies  the  dissolution  of  indi-
viduality  in  the  whole  of  society.  However,  the  twentieth
century  has  witnessed  strong  totalitarian  regimes  that,
paradoxically  as  it  may  sound,  vowed  to  uphold  citizens’
‘common  good’.  Clearly,  these  regimes  conceived  the  com-
mon  good  in  utilitarian  terms,  defending  their  abusive
behavior  in  the  name  of  the  ‘greatest  good  for  the  greatest
number’.  ‘Gemeinnutz  geht  vor  Eigennutz’  --  ‘the  common
good  before  the  good  of  the  individual’  --  said  a  Nazi  slo-
gan.  Rudolf  Jung  popularized  it  in  his  book  Der  Nationale
Sozialismus.5 Communists  also  worked  for  the  common
good.
Though  ‘softer’  than  these  regimes,  current  ‘communi-
tarian’  thinkers  also  lean  toward  this  wing,  as  they  react
against  liberals.  Roughly,  for  them  the  common  good  is  more
common  than  good.  Their  strong  inter-subjective  anthropo-
logical  conception  builds  speciﬁc  communities  that  shape
personal  character.  As  Keys  (2006,  p.  46)  points  out,  ‘it  is
difﬁcult  to  see  where  these  communities  and  their  mem-
bers  are  to  look  beyond  (or  beneath)  their  own  bounds  for
5 1922, 2nd edition, information excerpted from http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Glossary of Nazi Germany.27
nsight  into  the  nature  and  content  of  the  manifold  human
ood’.  Consequently,  regardless  of  appearances,  commu-
itarians  stand  closer  to  liberals  than  to  ‘monists’,  as,  in
act,  the  communitarian  proposition  comes  down  to  a  liberal
nion  of  many  communities  (rather  than  individuals).  After
xposing  the  failures  of  communitarian  criticisms  against  lib-
ralism,  Amy  Gutmann  explains  why  she  sees  both  positions
s  complementary:  ‘‘communitarianism  has  the  potential
or  helping  us  discover  a  politics  that  combines  community
ith  a  commitment  to  basic  liberal  values’’  (1985,  p.  320).
Given  the  shortcomings  of  liberal,  ‘‘totalitarian’’  and
ommunitarian  views  on  the  common  good  described  ear-
ier,  I  think  it  is  worthwhile  to  explore  the  implications  of
he  classical  common  good  notion,  which  requires  a  theory
f  the  good  based  on  an  anthropological  inquiry  that  discov-
rs  the  characteristics  of  human  nature  and  rationally  argues
or  them.  This  basis  will  prove  essential  to  build  a social  and
conomic  policy  leading  to  the  Aristotelian  version  of  the
ommon  good.
.  The Aristotelian conception of human
ature and the consequent theory of the good
n  my  paper  (2012,  p.  164),  I  presented  a  list  of  Aristotelian
anthropological  constants’  that  included  the  following
with  slight  changes):
1  Reason:  ‘Man  alone  of  the  animals  is  furnished  with  the
faculty  of  language’  (Politics  I,  2,  1253a  9--10).  The  word
used  by  Aristotle  to  express  language  is  logos, also  mean-
ing  reason,  which  is  the  source  of  language.  Reason  has
a  three-fold  use:  theoretical,  technical  and  practical.
Relying  on  practical  reason,  human  beings  are  able  to
discriminate  between  good  and  evil.
2  Sociability  (a  political  animal):  ‘there  is  therefore  an
immanent  impulse  in  all  men  toward  an  association  of
this  order’  (Politics  I,  2,  1253a  29--30).  For  Aristotle,
social  interaction  proves  crucial  for  both  sustainability
and  the  development  of  rationality.  Individuals  have  a
natural  impulse  toward  association:  they  do  not  need  a
contract  to  become  social  --  they  are  born  social.
3  Language:  the  human  being  is  the  only  animal  furnished
with  this  capacity.  Language  does  not  develop  indepen-
dently  from  society  (Politics  I,  2).
4  Communication,  enabled  by  rationality,  sociability  and
language.
5  Moral  sense:  Aristotle  asserts  that  ‘It  is  the  peculiarity
of  man  (.)  that  he  alone  possesses  a  perception  of  good
and  evil,  of  the  just  and  the  unjust,  and  of  other  similar
qualities’  (Politics  I,  2,  1253a  14--18).
6  The  ability  to  look  for  common  aims,  as  a  clariﬁcation
of  the  deep  meaning  of  sociability.  For  Aristotle,  these
aims  are  shared  by  a  family  or  a  polis: these  are  not  mere
aggregations  (Politics  I,  2,  1253a  18--20).
7  Freedom.  A  different  aim  of  the  will  or  a  weakness  of
the  will  (akrasia) might  lead  to  other  behaviors,  which
might  be  deemed  irrational,  or  asocial  or  immoral.
A  few  more  should  be  added  now:
8  Fulﬁllment  or  eudaimonia  as  the  individual  and  common
end  of  all  human  beings  (Nicomachean  Ethics  I,  4  and  7).
9  Virtue  as  the  way  of  achieving  eudaimonia  (NE  I,  7).
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0  Given  that  man  is  a  political  animal,  individuals  must
look  for  the  common  good,  which  is  their  true  good.  This
makes  them  ﬂourish  (eudaimonia  NE  I,  2).
Given  the  previous  traits  of  human  nature,  what  is  good
or  man?
 Life  is  the  cornerstone  without  which  human  beings
cannot  develop  their  capabilities.  Furthermore,  in  con-
temporary  times,  life  is  a  high  value,  regardless  of  the
extent  to  which  these  capabilities  are  indeed  developed.
 Virtue, that  is  mainly  necessary  for  achieving  eudaimonia.
 Sociability  and  all  the  virtues  that  foster  it  --  including  jus-
tice,  friendship,  and  magnanimity  --  are  also  good  for  the
human  being.  The  main  bond  that  brings  people  together
is  sharing  the  knowledge  of  the  common  good.  A  lot  of
activities  and  forms  of  association  enable  sociability  and
fulﬁllment.
 Theoretical  and  practical  knowledge  are  also  basic  goods.
According  to  the  famous  Aristotelian  ergon  argument,
contemplation  is  the  ﬁnal  end  of  human  beings:  ‘‘the
human  good  proves  to  be  activity  of  the  soul  in  accord
with  virtue,  and  indeed  with  the  best  and  most  complete
virtue  [.  .  .] Moreover  in  a  complete  life’’  (Nicomachean
Ethics  I,  7,  1098a  17--19).  In  the  ﬁnal  chapter  of  Nico-
machean  Ethics  (X,  7,  1177a  13--23),  he  goes  on  to  specify
this  virtue:
‘If  happiness  is  activity  in  accordance  with  virtue,  it
is  reasonable  that  it  should  be  in  accordance  with  the
highest  virtue;  and  this  will  be  that  of  the  best  thing
in  us.  Whether  it  be  reason  (noûs) or  something  else
that  is  this  element  which  is  thought  to  be  our  natural
ruler  and  guide  and  to  take  thought  of  things  noble
and  divine,  whether  it  be  itself  also  divine  or  only
the  most  divine  element  in  us,  the  activity  of  this  in
accordance  with  its  proper  virtue  will  be  perfect  hap-
piness.  That  this  activity  is  contemplative  (theoretiké)
we  have  already  said.’
Theoretical  knowledge  implies  the  need  to  receive  edu-
cation,  freedom  to  do  research,  and  devoting  time  to
learning  and  studying.  Practical  knowledge  requires  edu-
cation,  both  formal  (ethics)  and  informal  (paideia,  aimed
at  shaping  a  good  character).
 Freedom  to  act  in  the  pursuit  of  the  goals  contributing  to
personal  fulﬁllment  is  a  relevant  good.
 Means  fostering  communication  and  participation  are
good  for  men.
 Work  is  also  a  signiﬁcant  means  to  achieve  other  goods,
becoming,  in  and  by  itself,  another  good.
The  former  goods  contribute  to  human  fulﬁllment,  the
ltimate  end  of  the  human  being,  his  individual  and  com-
on  good.  However,  these  considerations  might  prove  too
eneral  to  design  speciﬁc  policies,  as  Aristotle  himself  would
robably  note.  In  Politics  II,  6,  he  complains  about  the  vague
haracter  of  Plato’s  criterion  for  determination  of  the  ideal
mount  of  property  in  the  cities:  an  amount  ‘sufﬁcient  for  a
ood  life:  this  is  too  general’  [kathóloumallon].  Thus,  Aris-
otle  wonders  ‘whether  it  is  not  better  to  determine  it  in
 different  --  that  is  to  say,  a  more  deﬁnite  --  way  than
lato’  (Politics  II,  6,  1265a  28--32).  In  NE  I,  7,  AristotleR.F.  Crespo
ntroduces  the  ‘ergon  argument’  also  by  complaining,  ‘Pre-
umably,  however,  to  say  that  happiness  is  the  chief  good
eems  a  platitude,  and  a  clearer  account  of  what  it  is  still
esired’  (1097b  22--24).  Indeed,  Aristotle  is  aware  of  the
eed  for  a  more  speciﬁc  deﬁnition  of  the  goods  that  are  to
e  sought  to  attain  happiness.  In  my  book  (2013,  pp.  59--62),
 brieﬂy  refer  to  some  more  concrete  goals  that  Aristotle
entions  throughout  his  works  on  politics  and  ethics,  which
ill  be  discussed  at  greater  length  next.
. Identifying speciﬁc means to attain the
ommon good
s  previously  mentioned,  Aristotle  believes  that  happiness
eeds  a  basis  upon  which  it  can  be  built;  it  needs  ‘external
oods’  (NE  I,  8,  1099a  31--32).  He  afﬁrms  in  Politics  that  ‘it
s  impossible  to  live  well  or  indeed  to  live  at  all,  unless  the
ecessary  [property]  conditions  are  present’  (Politics  I,  4,
253b  24--25).  ‘We  have  to  remember,  he  also  afﬁrms,  that
 certain  amount  of  equipment  is  necessary  for  the  good
ife’  (Politics  VII,  8,  1331b  39--40).
These  external  goods  have  to  be  in  accordance  with  the
oods  of  the  body  and  the  goods  of  the  soul:  ‘all  of  these  dif-
erent  goods  should  belong  to  the  happy  man’  (VII,  1,  1323a
6--27).  Aristotle  notes:  ‘felicity  belongs  more  to  those  who
ave  cultivated  their  character  and  mind  to  the  uttermost,
nd  kept  acquisition  of  external  goods  within  moderate  lim-
ts’  (VII,  1,  1323b  1--3).  Thus,  ‘the  best  way  of  life,  for
ndividuals  severally  as  well  as  for  states  collectively,  is  the
ife  of  goodness  duly  equipped  with  such  a  store  of  requisites
i.e.,  of  external  goods  and  of  goods  of  the  body]  as  makes  it
ossible  to  share  in  the  activities  of  goodness’  (Politics  VII,
,  1323b  40  --  1324a  1,  square  brackets  by  Barker).
Although  the  goods  of  the  soul  should  be  more  appreci-
ted  than  other  goods,  their  priority  is  ‘ontological’.  The
emporal  priority  is  the  inverse:
‘children’s  bodies  should  be  given  attention  before  their
souls;  and  the  appetites  should  be  the  next  part  of  them
to  be  regulated.  But  the  regulation  of  their  appetites
should  be  intended  for  the  beneﬁt  of  their  minds  --just  as
the  attention  given  to  their  bodies  should  be  intended  for
the  beneﬁt  of  their  souls’  (Politics  VII,  15,  1334b  25--28).
First,  we  must  ensure  a  healthy  and  well-nourished  body;
hen,  we  must  put  our  appetites  in  order  and,  ﬁnally,  we
ust  seek  the  goods  of  the  soul.  Even  the  man  who  leads
 theoretical  life  needs  external  goods  (cf.  NE  X,  8,  1178b
4--35).
What  goods  do  members  of  a  city  need?  What  goods  must
he  city  provide?
‘The  ﬁrst  thing  to  be  provided  is  food.  The  next  is  arts  and
crafts;  for  life  is  a  business  which  needs  many  tools.  The
third  is  arms:  the  members  of  a  state  must  bear  arms  in
person,  partly  in  order  to  maintain  authority  and  repress
disobedience,  and  partly  in  order  to  meet  any  thread  of
external  aggression.  The  fourth  thing  which  has  to  be  pro-
vided  is  a certain  supply  of  property,  alike  for  domestic
use  and  for  military  purposes.  The  ﬁfth  (but  in  order  of
merit,  the  ﬁrst)  is  an  establishment  for  the  service  of  the
gods,  or  as  it  is  called,  public  worship.  The  sixth  thing,
and  the  most  vitally  necessary,  is  a  method  of  deciding
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of  teaching,  to  the  right  constitutional  temper’  (PoliticsThe  common  good  and  economics  
what  is  demanded  by  the  public  interest  and  what  is  just
in  men’s  private  dealings.  These  are  the  services  which
every  state  may  be  said  to  need’  (Politics  VII,  8,  1328b
5--16).
Food  is  essential  to  Aristotle:  ‘none  of  the  citizens  should
go  in  need  of  subsistence’  [trophês:  food]  (Politics  VII,  10,
1130a  2).  He  proposes  a  system  of  common  meals  funded  by
individual  contributions,  depending  on  the  wealth  level  of
citizens.  He  also  emphasizes  the  relevance  of  water:  ‘this
[provision  of  good  water]  is  a  matter  which  ought  not  to  be
treated  lightly.  The  elements  we  use  the  most  and  oftenest
for  the  support  of  our  bodies  contribute  most  to  their  health;
and  water  and  air  have  both  an  effect  of  this  nature’  (Politics
VII,  11,  1330b  10--14).
For  Aristotle,  the  best  form  of  political  regime  ‘is  one
where  power  is  vested  in  the  middle  class’  (Politics  IV,  11,
1295b  34--35).  Thus,  ‘it  is  therefore  the  greatest  of  blessings
for  a  state  that  its  members  should  possess  a  moderate  and
adequate  property’  (Politics  IV,  11,  1295b  39--40).  However,
he  is  against  an  ‘over-assistance’  of  people:
‘the  policy  nowadays  followed  by  demagogues  should  be
avoided.  It  is  their  habit  to  distribute  any  surplus  among
the  people;  and  the  people,  in  the  act  of  taking,  ask  for
the  same  again.  To  help  the  poor  in  this  way  is  to  ﬁll  a
leaky  jar  [.  .  .] Yet  it  is  the  duty  of  a  genuine  democrat
to  see  to  it  that  the  masses  are  not  excessively  poor.
Poverty  is  the  cause  of  the  defects  of  democracy.  That
is  the  reason  why  measures  should  be  taken  to  ensure
a  permanent  level  of  prosperity.  This  is  in  the  interest
of  all  the  classes,  including  the  prosperous  themselves
[.  . .] The  ideal  method  of  distribution,  if  a  sufﬁcient  fund
can  be  accumulated,  is  to  make  such  grants  sufﬁcient  for
the  purchase  of  a  plot  of  land:  failing  that,  they  should
be  large  enough  to  start  men  in  commerce  or  agriculture.
Notables  who  are  men  of  feeling  and  good  sense  may  also
undertake  the  duty  of  helping  the  poor  to  ﬁnd  occupa-
tions  -- each  taking  charge  of  a  group,  and  each  giving
a  grant  to  enable  the  members  of  his  group  to  make  a
start’  (Politics  VI,  5,  1320a  30  --  1320b  9).
According  to  Aristotle,  external  goods  are  necessary  to
achieve  happiness,  but  they  do  not  in  themselves  constitute
happiness:  ‘Success  or  failure  in  life  does  not  depend  on
these  [fortunes],  but  human  life,  as  we  said,  needs  these  as
mere  additions,  while  virtuous  activities  or  their  opposites
are  what  determine  happiness  or  their  reverse’  (NE  I,  10,
1100b  9--10).
What  are,  according  to  Aristotle,  the  facts  and  virtues
that  contribute  to  a  happy  life?  In  Nicomachean  Ethics  he
mentions  honor,  wisdom  and  pleasure  (I,  6,  1096b),  and  then
he  adds  reason  (noûn) and  every  virtue  (I,  7,  1097b  2).  In
Rhetoric  he  lists  ‘good  birth,  plenty  of  friends,  good  friends,
wealth,  good  children,  plenty  of  children,  a  happy  old  age,
also  such  bodily  excellences  as  health,  beauty,  strength,
large  stature,  athletic  powers,  together  with  fame,  honor,
good  luck,  and  virtue’  (Rhetoric  I,  5,  1360b  19  ff).  Does
this  mean  that  a  person,  e.g.,  of  short  stature  cannot  be
happy?  No,  this  list  includes  some  of  the  things  that  may  con-
tribute  to  happiness,  not  its  necessary  constituents.  Virtue
is  what  determines  happiness.  The  virtuous  man,  that  is,
the  man  who  rightly  exercises  his  practical  reason,  knows c29
ow  to  combine  the  elements  at  hand,  even  when  some-
hing  is  lacking,  in  order  to  be  happy.  From  a eudaimonist
erspective,  happiness  is  not  a  matter  of  what  you  own  but
 matter  of  how  you  live  your  life,  whatever  your  circum-
tances:  ‘healthy  or  unhealthy,  rich  or  poor,  educated  or
neducated,  we  should  think  about  our  lives  and  try  to  live
hem  well’  (Annas,  2011,  p.  129).  To  live  our  lives  well  is  to
evelop  our  capacities  in  the  pursuit  of  worthwhile  or  useful
bjectives  (see  Annas,  2011,  p.  140).  Therefore,  practical
eason  and  virtue  are  the  keys  to  happiness.
The  goal  of  the  polis  is  to  secure  happiness  for  its  citi-
ens.  Law-givers  must  foster  the  development  of  virtue  in
ts  citizens.  In  Nicomachean  Ethics, Aristotle  states:  ‘leg-
slators  make  the  citizens  good  by  forming  habits  in  them,
nd  this  is  the  wish  of  every  legislator,  and  those  who  do
ot  effect  it  miss  their  mark,  and  it  is  in  this  that  a  good
onstitution  differs  from  a  bad  one’  (II,  1,  1103b  3--6).  In
is  view,  law-givers  can  promote  virtues  through  two  indi-
ect  ways:  education  and  law.  Virtues,  law  and  education
ake  up  a  self-developing,  virtuous  circle  that  makes  people
appy  and  contributes  to  political  stability.  Virtuous  people
bey  the  law.  To  be  virtuous,  people  must  be  educated  since
he  earliest  stages  of  life;  but  education  must  be  reinforced
y  laws  (cf.  NE  V,  2,  1130b  23--27  and  X,  9,  1179b  20  --  1180a
2).
He  also  discusses  whether  education  should  be  public  or
rivate.  He  believes  that  private  education  ‘has  an  advan-
age  over  public,  as  private  medical  treatment  has;  for  while
n  general  rest  and  abstinence  from  food  are  good  for  a  man
n  a  fever,  for  a  particular  man  they  may  not  be  [.  .  .] It  would
eem,  then,  that  the  detail  is  worked  out  with  more  preci-
ion  if  the  control  is  private;  for  each  person  is  more  likely  to
et  what  suits  his  case’  (NE  X,  9,  1180b  7--12).  Nevertheless,
n  Aristotle’s  opinion,  legislators  must  concern  themselves
ith  education,  and  parents  must  instruct  their  children
hen  the  city  fails  to  provide  education,  and  vice  versa.
e  describes  the  components  of  a  good  education  relating
hem  with  the  development  of  virtues  (Politics  VIII,  3 and
f.).
Political  institutions  are  designed  to  help  ensure  the  hap-
iness  of  the  people.  ‘The  end  and  purpose  of  a  polis  is  the
ood  life,  and  the  institutions  of  social  life  are  means  to
hat  end’  (Politics  III,  9  1280b  39--40).  Aristotle  extensively
evelops  different  ways  of  electing  assemblies,  magistracies
nd  courts  and  indicates  how  people  should  best  participate
n  these  election  and  appointment  processes  (Politics  IV,  14
nd  ff.).  These  institutions  can  be  called  into  account  by
itizens  (Politics  VI,  4,  1318b  29).  Education  is  the  best  way
o  preserve  these  institutions:
‘The  greatest,  however,  of  all  the  means  we  have  men-
tioned  for  ensuring  the  stability  of  constitutions  --but  one
that  nowadays  is  generally  neglected--  is  the  education
of  citizens  in  the  spirit  of  their  constitution.  There  is  no
proﬁt  of  the  best  of  laws,  even  when  they  are  sanctioned
by  general  civic  consent,  if  the  citizens  themselves  have
not  been  attuned,  by  the  force  of  habit  and  the  inﬂuenceV,  9,  1310a  12--18).
Friendship  and  unanimity  (concord  --omónoia--)  also  hold
ities  together  (NE  VIII,  1,  1155a  22--26;  IX,  6,  1167b  2).
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common  good,  these  individual  ends  should  match  the  com-
mon  good.  Examples  of  this  tendency  to  consider  ends  in
economics  include  happiness  economics  and  the  capability
approach  (CA).6 Different  psychological  theories  underlie
6 I could have also considered the proposal initiated by Rubio de
Urquía (see his 2003 and 2005) at the Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, which factors in the fundamental role of agents’ intention-0  
Summing  up,  law  and  education  foster  the  development
f  virtues,  and  a  life  of  virtues  brings  about  fulﬁllment,
hich  is  the  end  or  common  good  of  the  political  community.
ccording  to  these  notions:
 The  best  political  system  is  an  egalitarian  regime,  ‘a  gen-
eral  system  of  liberty  based  on  equality’  (Politics  VI,  2,
1317b  16--17);  thus,  government  should  concern  itself
with  maintaining  a  certain  equality,  but  not  through  con-
ﬁscatory  measures;  ‘the  magistrate  (.  .  .) is  the  guardian
of  justice,  and,  if  of  justice,  then  of  equality  also’  (NE  V,
6,  1134b  1).  People  must  participate  in  Politics.
 Speciﬁcally,  an  Aristotelian  policy  would  not  distribute
funds  directly  to  people  except  for  funds  targeted  at  cre-
ating  jobs.
 The  government  should  actively  seek  to  avoid  unemploy-
ment  and  promote  business  and  exchange.
 In  extreme  cases,  it  should  provide  food.
 The  government  should  also  concern  itself  with  the  health
of  the  population,  ensuring  the  necessary  conditions  for
adequate  health  care  (safe  drinking  water  and  clean  air).
 Another  topic  of  great  concern  should  be  education.  The
government  should  create  adequate  educational  institu-
tions  and  offer  necessary  funding;  whether  education  be
public  or  private.
 It  should  also  focus  largely  on  creating  and  enforcing  good
laws  and  courts,  and  providing  legal  institutions  and  their
corresponding  funding.
 The  government  should  encourage  all  kinds  of  intermedi-
ate  organizations  that  freely  promote  family,  education,
friendship,  children  and  elderly  care,  job  creation,  sports,
arts,  religion,  charity  and,  specially,  virtues  of  all  kinds.
 In  the  absence  of  institutions  to  protect  children  and
the  elderly,  it  should  step  up  and  undertake  this  social
activity.
These  are  more  speciﬁc  means  than  the  general  end  of
udaimonia.  Governments  should  identify  the  best  speciﬁc
eans  to  enable  its  citizens  to  achieve  the  happiest  (‘eudai-
oniest’)  possible  life.  However,  citizens  must  also  play
heir  part,  promoting  and  exploiting  these  means  in  order  to
arry  out  the  activities  that  make  them  eudaimon.  Clearly,
he  common  good  is  not  just  the  task  only  of  government,
ut  also  of  citizens.  At  this  point,  someone  may  object  this
roposal  in  a  way  like  this:
‘The  Aristotelian  political  program  is  an  interesting  addi-
tion,  though  one  might  ask  whether  a  program  intended
for  a  small,  homogeneous  Greek  city-state  can  be  so
easily  applied  to  the  present.  After  surveying  most  of
its  principles  --  egalitarianism,  job  creation,  avoiding
unemployment,  providing  food,  encouraging  health,  edu-
cation,  legal  institutions,  intermediate  organizations,
and  social  protection  of  children  and  the  elderly  --  it  is
notable  that  this  program  is  practically  indistinguishable
from  that  of  the  twentieth-century  liberal  welfare  state.
Was  this  parallel  intentional?  If  so,  in  what  way  does  this
program  really  depend  upon  a  common  anthropology  and
idea  of  the  Good  --  since  these  are  generally  jettisoned
in  contemporary  liberal  theory?  Is  this  not  a  somewhat
liberalized  account  of  the  classical  theory?’
a
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These  are  all  very  good  points.  Beginning  with  the  ﬁnal
uestion,  the  answer  is  ‘no’.  I  do  not  intend  to  water
own  the  classical  political  and  common  good  doctrines.
his  ‘Aristotelian  political  program’  cannot  survive  outside
 theory  of  the  Good.  An  anthropologically  (wrongly)  rooted
iberalism  maintaining  a  strong  notion  of  autonomy  (Kant,
on  Humboldt,  Mill)  and  leading  to  a  crude  individualism
enies  any  notion  of  the  common  good,  while  an  exclusively
olitical  liberalism  (Montesquieu,  the  Foundation  Fathers,
ocqueville,  Constant)  puts  this  notion  into  brackets  and
acks  criteria  to  decide  in  situations  that  touch  on  the  human
ood  (for  example,  abortion,  homosexual  unions,  or  eco-
omic  issues,  like  child  labor  and  human  organs´trade).  As
 have  quoted  from  MacIntyre,  ‘without  some  determinate
onception  of  the  good  and  the  best,  it  would  be  impossi-
le  to  provide  adequate  answers  to  these  questions’  (1990,
.  353).  A  civil  society  cannot  survive  without  some  shared
deas  about  the  human  Good.  And  these  ideas  cannot  be
hared  if  they  are  not  based  on  a  reasoned  theory  of  the
ood.  As  already  explained,  according  to  Aristotle,  the  main
im  of  political  society  is  human  being’s  eudaimonia, the
uzen  of  citizens.  It  is  not  restricted  to  an  alliance  (as  he
rgues  in  Pol  III,  9).  This  aim  of  civil  society  is  also  sustained
y  Aquinas  (see  In  Ethic  1,  n.  4;  2,  n.  29;  ST  I-II  q.  95,  a.  1;
.  188,  a.  1  and  Lachance,  1939,  Chapter  XVI).
As  for  the  observation,  ‘one  might  ask  whether  a  pro-
ram  intended  for  a  small,  homogeneous  Greek  city-state
an  be  so  easily  applied  to  the  present’,  this  is  a  usual  objec-
ion  to  Aristotelian  political  theory.  It  has  been  suggested
hat  smaller  societies  in  current  states  may  be  recognized
s  embodying  a  theory  of  the  good.  Aristotle  also  considers
he  difﬁculties  related  to  the  size  of  the  city,  and  he  is  also
ware  that  his  ideal  city  does  not  exist  in  his  time.  However,
e  should  not  forget  that  Aristotle’s  proposal  is  ethical:  it
xposes  what  can  be  done,  a  normative  ideal,  a  paradigm.
n  fact,  I think  that  we,  citizens  of  different  states,  aspire
o  more  than  a  mere  alliance.
Having  deﬁned  several  signiﬁcant  notions,  let  us  now  ana-
yze  some  economic  theories  from  the  point  of  view  of  the
ommon  good.
. The capability approach and the economics
f  happiness in light of  the classical doctrine
f the common good
t  present,  we  witness  an  increasing  acknowledgment  of
he  need  to  take  into  account  the  ends  of  individual  behav-
or  in  economics.  According  to  the  classical  doctrine  of  thelity, goals, and action plans to explain the evolutionary dynamism
f an economy. His disciples have used this framework to study other
henomena, like the emergence of complexity in economics (Mun˜oz
nd Encinar, 2014b) or the processes involved in innovation systems
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the  economics  of  happiness.  However,  some  doubts  have
been  raised  about  the  appropriateness  of  these  theories.  On
the  other  hand,  Aristotelian  eudaimonia  is  a  concept  of  hap-
piness  that  surely  leads  to  the  common  good.  Amartya  Sen’s
CA  concentrates  on  well-being,  capabilities  and  function-
ings,  on  achievement  and  commitment,  and  gives  priority
to  ends.  This  concern  with  ends  leads  Sen  to  realize  the
narrowness  of  the  currently  valid  conception  of  economic
rationality.  He  notes:  ‘Indeed,  at  the  risk  of  sounding  unduly
‘grand’,  it  can  be  argued  that  it  is  important  to  reclaim  for
humanity  the  ground  that  has  been  taken  from  it  by  various
arbitrarily  narrow  formulations  of  the  demands  of  rational-
ity’  (2002,  p.  51).  He  even  stresses  the  need  to  use  practical
reason  to  scrutinize  and  decide  about  ends.  The  problem
with  Sen’s  approach  is  its  intentional  under-deﬁnition  of
the  contents  of  ends.  Martha  Nussbaum  has  criticized  Sen
in  this  respect,  giving  rise  to  a  huge  debate  on  the  ‘list  of
capabilities’.  Nussbaum  argues  in  favor  of  a  particular  list
of  capabilities  that  all  individuals  ought  to  have,  while  Sen
prefers  to  leave  the  matter  open  (see,  e.g.,  Sen,  1993,  2004;
Nussbaum,  2003).  The  problem,  therefore,  is  as  follows:
should  there  be  a  list  of  speciﬁc  capabilities  to  guide  public
policy  or  would  a  formal  framework  to  be  ﬁlled  in  later  on
any  given  occasion  be  enough?  Sen’s  answer  favors  the  latter.
From  the  viewpoint  of  the  classical  theory  of  the  common
good,  although  an  over-speciﬁcation  is  not  desirable,  Sen’s
proposal  of  an  open  list  is  not  enough.  His  conception  is
ultimately  liberal,  in  the  sense  used  here.
7.1.  The  economics  of  happiness
First  and  foremost,  it  should  be  emphasized  that  the  fact
that  the  economics  of  happiness  focuses  on  happiness  makes
for  a  good  starting  point,  since  the  theory  of  common  good
also  features  happiness  as  ultimate  good.  However,  it  will
depend  on  the  concept  of  happiness  adopted.  The  concept
of  eudaimonia  differs  largely  from  our  modern  notion  of  hap-
piness,  which  carries  utilitarian  and  hedonistic  resonances.
Both  Annas  (2011,  p.  127)  and  Barrotta  (2008,  p.  149)  criti-
cally  quote  the  same  passage  in  Richard  Layard’s  Happiness.
Lessons  from  a  New  Science  (2005,  p.  4):  ‘Happiness  is  feel-
ing  good,  and  misery  is  feeling  bad’.  Following  Bentham,
Layard  believes  that  happiness  is  a  hedonic  reality  that  can
be  measured.  At  the  same  time,  he  rejects  Mill’s  qualitative
dimension  of  happiness.  Additionally,  Layard  (2007,  p.  162)
asserts  that  ‘good  tastes  are  those  which  increase  happi-
ness,  and  vice  versa’.  Wijngaards  (2012,  p.  103)  summarizes
his  analysis  of  Layard’s  concept  of  happiness  stating  that
‘it  is  to  be  understood  in  a  hedonic  sense,  based  upon  a
pleasure/pain  duality’.  The  problem  with  this  concept  of
happiness  is  that  it  is  too  rudimentary.  Undergoing  difﬁcul-
ties  is  part  of  true  happiness:  as  Annas  asserts,  ‘a  life  of
having  all  your  desires  fulﬁlled  without  the  problems  cre-
ated  by  human  neediness  leaves  humans  with  nothing  to  live
for,  nothing  to  propel  them  onwards’  (2011,  p.  137).7 True
of Mun˜oz and Encinar (2014a). This remains a potential topic for
future papers.
7 Scitovsky (1976) had anticipated the concern of happiness eco-
nomics and had proposed a richer conception of happiness mainly
consisting in enjoying the challenge of novelty activities. Scitovsky
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appiness  goes  beyond  life  satisfaction.  Aristotle  strongly
isqualiﬁes  the  hedonic  view:  ‘the  generality  of  mankind
hen  shows  themselves  to  be  utterly  slavish,  by  preferring
hat  is  only  a  life  for  cattle’  (NE  I,  4,  1095b  18--20).  He
tates  that  eudaimonia  is  an  ultimate  end,  not  a  good  for
he  sake  of  another  end,  as  is  the  case  of  enjoyment.
Begley  (2010)  has  reviewed  the  literature  on  surveys  on
ubjective  wellbeing  and  on  physiological  (objective)  studies
f  happiness.  He  has  concluded  that  there  is  general  agree-
ent  that  these  two  psychological  approaches  to  happiness
re  mainly  hedonic  and  that  truly  eudaimonic  dimensions
ould  complete  the  assessment  of  happiness.  Comim  (2005,
.  163)  remarks  that  the  economics  of  happiness  is  a
asically  descriptive  approach,  ‘without  a  clear  link  with
stablished  ethical  paradigms  that  discuss  not  only  what
eople  do,  but  what  they  should  do  to  live  well  as  human
eings’.  More  sophisticated  psychological  constructs  include
udaimonic  elements  such  as  positive  relations  with  others,
ersonal  growth,  and  purpose  or  meaning  in  life.  However,
egley  notes,  they  make  no  references  to  virtue.  Bruni
nd  Porta  (2007,  pp.  xx--xxiv)  add  that  economic  theories
hat  indirectly  attempt  to  understand  the  logic  of  happi-
ess  do  not  consider  the  role  of  sociality-as-relationality.
 quick  review  of  the  literature  on  methods  and  question-
aires  for  measuring  subjecting  well  being  reveals  that  the
ords  usually  associated  with  happiness  include  ‘tastes’,
feelings’,  ‘desires’,  ‘satisfaction’,  ‘pleasure  and  displea-
ure’.  As  regards  objective  happiness,  as  Frey  and  Stutzer
2002,  p.  5)  assert,  ‘this  approach  comes  close  to  the  idea
f  a  hedometer’.
I conclude  that  in  order  to  effectively  focus  on  and
ddress  happiness,  the  economics  of  happiness  should  pay
ttention  to  and  adopt  the  Aristotelian  concept  of  eudai-
onia.  More  than  an  economics  of  happiness  we  need
nd  economics  of  eudaimonia  or  ﬂourishing.  This  means  a
adically  different  conception  from  current  happiness  eco-
omics.  The  resonance  of  the  word  ‘happiness’  advices  us
o  reformulate  and  rename  happiness  economics  as  maybe
economics  of  ﬂourishing’  or  better,  ‘economics  of  the  com-
on  good’,  in  its  classical  version.8
.2.  The  capability  approach
s  with  happiness  economics,  ﬁrst,  it  should  be  noted  that
en’s  CA  comes  closer  to  considering  the  theory  of  com-
on  good.  However,  it  fails  to  do  so  in  the  classical  way.
n  Sen’s  view,  CA  is  consistent  with  diverse  individual  theo-
ies  of  the  good:  this  implicitly  implies  that  common  good  is
ot  understood  in  classical  terms.  Now,  this  results  from  the
ack  of  a  conception  of  human  nature.  Sen  devotes  a  whole
ection  of  his  book  Reason  Before  Identity  to  the  question
Discovery  or  Choice?’  (1999,  pp.  15--19). He  concludes  that
ndividual  identity  is  constructed  and  not  simply  discovered.
eople  have  the  power  of  self-deﬁnition.  Thus,  we  cannot
rescribe  a  set  of  goals  without  falling  in  a paternalistic  or
uthoritarian  stance.
s positively quoted by Csikszentmihalyi (1999), the founder of the
ositive psychology current.
8 On this, see our paper 2015.
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Sen  explicitly  asserts  (1993,  p.  48)  that  ‘quite  differ-
nt  speciﬁc  theories  of  value  may  be  consistent  with  the
apability  approach’  and  that  ‘the  capability  approach  is
onsistent  and  combinable  with  several  different  substan-
ive  theories’.  The  fact  is  that,  in  the  end,  Sen  is  a  liberal  à
a  Rawls  (despite  his  critique  of  him).  This  criticism  of  Sen
s  concurrent  with  disapproval  received  by  Sen  himself  for
is  ‘under-elaborated  and  overextended  notion  of  freedom’
see,  e.g.,  Gasper  and  van  Staveren,  2003;  Nussbaum,  2003).
eneulin  clearly  expresses  the  central  idea  underlying  this
riticism:  ‘Freedom  is  not  the  only  good  to  promote,  but  one
mong  others’  (Deneulin,  2002,  p.  506).
Nussbaum,  Gasper  and  van  Staveren  have  viewed  Sen’s
ecent  emphasis  on  freedom  with  fear  and  suspicion,  par-
icularly  in  Development  as  Freedom.  In  their  opinion,  Sen
as  always  concerned  himself  with  poverty  and  inequality
nd,  now,  they  complain,  he  has  abandoned  his  ﬁrst  love  to
efend  freedom.  Their  rationale  is  not  unfounded.  Freedom
ay  include  both  good  and  bad  dimensions.  Freedom  leading
o  bad  actions  is  not  a  value.  The  very  language  of  freedom
ay  be  misleading:  ‘since  freedom  does  not  have  this  over-
rching  meaning  in  everyday  parlance  (.  .  .) Sen  has,  in  some
ense,  downsized  his  notion  of  capability  in  giving  so  much
mportance  to  the  language  of  freedom,  ignoring  the  bag-
age  that  comes  with  the  term’  (Agarwal  et  al.,  2003,  p.  8).
asper  and  van  Staveren  recommend,  among  other  things,
he  use  of  the  term  ‘capabilities’  over  ‘freedom’  (2003,  p.
38)  when  stressing  the  values  of  democracy,  respect  and
riendship  (2003,  p.  146),  and  they  highlight  that  freedom  is
ust  one  value  and  that  there  are  two  other  spheres  of  value
n  life,  namely,  justice  and  caring  (2003,  p.  152). Like  the
conomics  of  happiness,  the  CA  needs  to  embrace  a  theory
f  the  good  to  fulﬁll  its  aims.  As  Deneulin  afﬁrms,  ‘the  capa-
ility  approach  hides  unavowed  positions  about  the  good,
ositions  that  it  can  no  longer  hide  when  the  theoretical
ramework  becomes  practice’  (2002,  p.  502).  She  argues
hat,  upon  implementation,  the  capability  approach  ends
p  being  perfectionist  and  paternalist  (Deneulin,  2002,  p.
02).  Deneulin  has  developed  a  ﬁeld  study  in  El  Salvador
bout  the  effect  of  migrations  and  remittances  in  poor  fam-
lies.  She  concludes  that  a  freedom-centered  approach  to
evelopment  like  Sen’s  is  not  enough  to  improve  the  liv-
ng  conditions  of  deprived  people.  She  asserts  (2006,  p.  13):
what  matters  is  not  as  much  the  expansion  of  individual
reedoms,  by  whatever  human  actions,  but  the  expansion  of
he  common  good  which  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  freedoms
f  individual  agents’.
I  conclude  that  the  capability  approach  would  beneﬁt
rom  the  adoption  of  the  classical  theory  of  the  com-
on  good  to  effectively  enhance  the  living  conditions  of
ndividuals.
. Conclusion
n  this  paper,  I  have  introduced  the  ‘classical  theory  of
he  common  good’,  arguing  that  it  implies  a  conception  of
uman  nature  and  a  substantive  theory  of  the  good.  I have
lso  discussed  the  problems  posed  by  the  alternatives  to
his  theory  --  liberalism  and  totalitarianism.  Then,  I  have
roceeded  to  extract  a  theory  of  human  nature  and  of
he  good  from  Aristotle’s  thought,  after  having  laid  down
B
BR.F.  Crespo
he  requirements  for  the  common  good  in  social  and  eco-
omic  policies.  These  requirements  are  not  speciﬁc  recipes
ut  just  some  thresholds  and  general  guidelines  that  should
e  adapted  to  particular  conditions,  times  and  places.  How-
ver,  I  think  that  they  are  useful.
Finally,  I  have  highlighted  the  shortcomings  of  the  eco-
omics  of  happiness  and  the  capability  approach  from  the
oint  of  view  of  the  doctrine  of  the  common  good.  The
otion  of  happiness  used  in  happiness  economics  is  rudimen-
ary,  and  Sen’s  capabilities  are  deﬁned  in  a  liberal  style.
 have  pointed  out  the  problems  of  both  these  hedonis-
ic  and  liberal  conceptions.  Nonetheless,  they  have  both
pproached  economic  affairs  from  what  I view  as  an  ade-
uate  perspective:  focusing  on  individuals’  ends.  I  have
rgued  here  that  the  hedonic  view  of  happiness  is  surpassed
y  the  richer  concept  of  eudaimonia, intrinsically  associ-
ted  with  the  common  good,  and  that  the  determination  of
apabilities  should  be  guided  by  a  notion  of  good  ruled  by
he  common  good.  Indeed,  I think  that  these  two  currents
ay  be  oriented  toward  the  achievement  of  the  common
ood  by  incorporating  the  classical  notions  of  eudaimonia,
he  theory  of  the  Good,  and  the  common  good.  The  pursuit
f  the  common  good  will  lead  to  policies  that  drive  human
ourishing.
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